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Use of the Uniform Ticket simplifies and reduces the administrative
burden on all officials concerned with enforcing the traffic safety program. The police officer can quickly and conveniently meet all legal
requirements of drawing, certifying, filing, and serving a complaint
and summons. The police records bureau has a complete record of
traffic arrests and case dispositions. The judge has a permanent traffic
docket and a convenient report form for reporting traffic convictions.
The Uniform Ticket also has the quality of being "non-fixable." The
active aid of three public officials-the individual officer, his supervisor, and the judge-would be required to dispose of a traffic citation
without judicial process. But most important, proper use of the Uniform Ticket will insure compliance with the Traffic Rules for Courts
of Limited Jurisdiction, thus avoiding needless reversal of traffic convictions on procedural grounds. Effective traffic safety programs depend upon certainty of punishment of traffic law violators. "Eliminating
dismissals of traffic violation prosecutions because of procedural technicalities would do much to further this end.

ADMISSIBILITY OF BLOOD SAMPLE EVIDENCE
IN CIVIL CASE
At the instigation of a police officer, a blood sample was taken
from defendant Clinton as he lay hospitalized with serious injuries
resulting from an automobile collision in which another person was
killed. The alcohol reading of the blood sample was 0.210, well
above presumptive intoxication.' Plaintiff, in an action for personal
injuries and wrongful death, sought to introduce defendant's blood test
in evidence. The trial court, in the absence of the jury, heard conflicting testimony and concluded that the blood sample was inadmissible
because taken without conscious consent. On appeal from a judgment
for defendant, the court reversed and remanded. Held: "Conscious
(1958). For additional information on this program, write to:
American Bar Association
Traffic Court Program
1155 E. 60th St.
Chicago 37, Illinois
'Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1965, ch. 155, § 60(2)(c), at 1993. The court in the principal case said: "The importance of the blood sample evidence is apparent from the
reading which was 0.210, which is well above presumptive intoxication under
R. C. IV. 46.56.010.... " 66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 898, 406 P.2d at 625. However, such
presumption cannot be applied in a civil case, according to Patton v. Tubbs, 66
Wash. Dec. 2d 269, 402 P.2d 355 (1965).
MODEL RULES GOVERNING PROCEDUREa IN TRAFFIC CASES
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consent" of the person from whom blood is taken is necessary for it
to be admissible in evidence; if the trial judge finds there is some
evidence of consent, the question of consent is to be decided by the
jury, which should be given "all ...

evidence, including the result

of the blood test." Poston v. Clinton, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d 896, 406 P.2d
623 (1965).
The Revised Code of Washington specifies that no person shall be
required to "submit" to chemical analysis of his blood, and that
"refusal to submit ... shall not be admissible in evidence in any
criminal prosecution ... or in any civil action."2 The Washington
court has construed this statute as granting a right to "refuse to consent."' The existence of consent is a question of fact.' It is a widely
accepted principle of evidence in both civil and criminal cases that
the trial judge should decide preliminary questions of fact necessary
to determine admissibility of evidence challenged under an exclusionary rule.' There are, however, exceptions to this general principle.'
Among the exceptions are holdings that, on a preliminary showing
that a reasonable man might find either way upon a disputed question
of fact, the judge must pass the question of admissibility along to
the jury for their determination.7
In the principal case, the court reasoned that the legislature intended
to require consent to the taking of any blood sample. Without distinguishing between civil and criminal cases, the court concluded that,
if conscious consent is not given, the blood test is inadmissible. The
court then said: "[W]isely or not, our system leaves the resolution of
issues of fact on conflicting evidence to the jury."8 In holding the
'Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1965, ch. 155, § 60(3), at 1994, (formerly WASH. REv.
CODE § 46.56.010).
'Zenith Transport, Ltd. v. Bellingham Nat'l Bank, 64 Wn. 2d 967, 395 P.2d 498
(1964), 40 WAsa. L. RFv. 375 (1965).
' State v. Reed, 56 Wn. 2d 668, 676, 354 P.2d 935, 941 (1960).
'McCoRmIcK, EvIDENCE § 53, at 123 (1954); 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2550 (3d
ed. 1940); Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the
Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HAnv. L. REv. 392 (1927). The question of consent
to the taking of a blood sample was held to be a preliminary question for the judge
to decide in People v. Knox, 178 Cal. App. 2d 502, 3 Cal. Rep. 70, 75 (Dist. Ct. App.
1960) ; People v. Cavallero, 178 Cal. App. 2d 5, 2 Cal. Rep. 687, 691 (Dist. Ct. App.
1960). On the respective functions of judge and jury as to preliminary questions of
fact, see generally Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963).
'E.g., People v. Miner, 96 Cal. App. 2d 43, 214 P.2d 557 (1950) (fact question
whether statement was accusatory left to the jury) ; State v. Perelli, 128 Conn. 172,
21 A.2d 389 (1941) (fact question whether testimony was based on inadmissible
memorandum left to jury); Cline v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 646, 229 S.W.2d 435
(1950) (fact question whether defendant gave consent to search of home left to jury).
'This approach is discussed, and other cases cited, in Maguire & Epstein, supra
note 5, at 420-21.
'66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 900, 406 P.2d at 626.
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question of consent to be one for the jury, the court reasoned that
((appropriate instructions" would serve as a safeguard against the
"possible prejudicial effect" of the blood test should it be found to
be inadmissible.
The court's requirement of "conscious consent" to the taking of a
blood sample raises problems with respect to police investigation and
trial procedure. The blood test for intoxication apparently now cannot
be used when the subject is temporarily unconscious9 or in such a high
state of intoxication that consent cannot be given.' ° And at trial a
question of fact-difficult to resolve-will always be raised.
By its decision in the principal case it appears that the Washington
Court has taken a more restrictive approach than is required under the
federal constitution." The court has made it clear that it considers such
invasion of a human being's veins, without his consent, to be in all cases
a violation of basic rights to privacy and protection against forced selfincrimination. That this was the legislative intent is made clear by the
recent passage of a provision requiring a "warning" to be given of the
"constitutional right" to refuse to submit to a blood test.' 2
It is not clear from the opinion what the standard of consent will be.
An affirmative showing of consent does not seem required by the
statute, which speaks in terms of submission. 3 Cases in other juris'A any authorities are to the contrary, holding that blood test evidence obtained
from an unconscious person is admissible. E.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S.
432 (1957); People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953), cert. denied,
347 U. S. 931 (1954) ; State v. Sturtevant, 96 N. H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950).
" It has been argued that a very high blood alcohol reading shows that the subject
was too intoxicated to consent. Courts which have considered this argument have
rejected it. Bowden v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 382, 246 P.2d 427 (1952) ; Jones v. State,
159 Tex. Crim. 29, 261 S. W.2d 161 (1952), cert. denied, 346 U. S. 830 (1953).
" The question whether the unconsented to taking of blood samples would violate
federal constitutional standards was investigated by the United States Supreme Court
in Briethaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), where it was held that consent was not
required. However, when the Court made federal self-incrimination standards binding
on the states, Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), some doubt was cast on Briethaupt.
The question whether the Court has changed its approach was resolved by Schmerber
v. California, 34 U.S.L. Week 4586 (U.S. June 20, 1966), where the Court held the
taking of a blood sample without the subject's consent did not deny petitioner due
process, did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination, and did not constitute
unlawful search and seizure.
The Court in Schmerber found, as to the self-incrimination claim, that a distinction
between "testimonial" and "physical" evidence allowed introduction of the blood sample
evidence. Such a distinction might be crucial under WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.44.080
(1956). See text at note 21 infra.
'Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1965, ch. 155, § 60(4). The court in the principal case
rejected the argument that this statute should operate retrospectively.
" The court in the principal case read the statute to require consent. This is not
a necessary interpretation; other courts have rejected the contention that the terms
"submit" and "consent" are synonymous. See State v. Trumbull, 23 Conn. Supp. 41,
176 A.2d 887, 889-90 (1961), and cases cited therein.
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dictions have held that failure to resist implies consent.14 It would be
unfortunate if actual expressed or written consent was required by the
Washington court. Public policy would not seem to require such expression. Washington's blood sample statute is more favorable to the
drinking driver than statutes of many sister states,' and police investigatory powers should not be unnecessarily restricted while
highway slaughter increases. Consent is required in order to protect
the dignity of the individual and prevent his will from being overcome
by force. If no force is used, and the subject consciously submits to
the taking, the objectives are met.
In contrast to the commendable position taken by the court on
the consent issue is its decision to let the disputed question of fact
go to the jury. The opinion fails to give a satisfactory rationale why
this approach was adopted in the principal case. 6 The holding was
not dictated by principles of stare decisis. The cases cited by the
court for the proposition that the jury should decide questions of
fact did not involve preliminary facts upon which admissibility of
evidence turned.'7
The approach of the court in the principal case is not consistent
with the Washington position in related areas of criminal law. The
trial judge, in Washington, makes the preliminary determination on
the question of voluntariness of a confession.' The court has recognized that it is correct for the trial judge to decide factual issues
necessary for determining admissibility of evidence gained by search
and seizure. 9 And the court has held that it is the province of the
judge to determine whether dying declarations were, in fact, given
in anticipation of death.2 0 The principal case is, of course, distinguish" State v. Koenig, 240 Iowa 592, 36 N.W2.d 765 (1949). In Marshall v. State,
159 Tex. Crim. 268, 262 S.W.2d 491 (1953), a laboratory technician told defendant
that he intended to take a specimen and defendant offered his arm in the proper
position; this was held to be sufficient consent. Cf. State v. Chavis, 83 R. I. 360,
116 A.2d 453, 455 (1955).
"Some states, for example, "imply" consent from the application for a drivers
license. See discussion of the various state statutes in Slough & Wilson, Alcohol
and the Motorist: Practical and Legal Problems of Chemical Testing, 44 MINN.
L. REv. 673 (1960).
"The court simply fails to recognize that, in many cases, preliminary questions
are decided by the trial judge.
'The court cited Shaw v. Browning, 59 Wn. 2d 133, 367 P.2d 17 (1961), and
Trosper v. Heffner, 51 Wn. 2d 268, 317 P.2d 530 (1957). Neither case involved
preliminary questions of fact necessary to determine admissibility of evidence
challenged under an exclusionary rule.
WASH. R. PLEAD., PRAc., PRoc. 10120W.
"' State v. Reed, 56 Wn. 2d 668, 676, 354 P.2d 935, 941 (1960).
' State v. Power, 24 Wash. 34, 45, 63 Pac. 1112, 1114 (1901) (semble); Territory v.
Klehn, 1 Wash. 584, 21 Pac. 31 (1889). But see State v. Mooney, 185 Wash. 681,
56 P2d 722 (1936).
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able in that it was a civil, rather than a criminal, action. Yet the court
here construed the statute, which is directed toward both civil and
criminal actions, without suggesting that a different procedure should
apply in a criminal trial. It appears, then, that the court, in blood
sample cases, has departed from the procedure which it has adopted in
related areas of law.
Further the court failed to refer to a statutory provision which
appears to be in point. The Washington Code specifies: "All questions
of law including the admissability of testimony, [and] the facts preliminary to such admission ...are to be decided by the court ..."I'

The right to refuse to submit to a blood test is usually based on
the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.22 The primary purpose of excluding evidence seized in violation of this right
is to prevent illegal police activities.2" It appears, however, that in
civil cases the exclusion of evidence taken in violation of this right
is not favored.2 4 Yet the Washington blood test statute requires exclusion in both civil and criminal cases. It is suggested that, by
allowing the preliminary fact question to go to the jury, the court
indicated an unwillingness to extend this exclusionary rule beyond the
minimum requirements of the statute. This reflects the disfavor with
which the rule is viewed in civil cases. The requirements of admissibility set out by the statute are technically met by instructing the
25
jury to disregard the evidence if they find a lack of consent.
There is basis for criticism of the court's failure in the principal
case to give full effect to the statutory exclusionary rule. Here the
evidence was seized by police order. This fact should cause applica" WASH. REV. CODE § 4.44.080 (1956). Neither party referred to this statute in
his brief.
"'See, e.g., State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956). Occasionally
the holding is grounded in part on the privilege against self-incrimination. See
generally Slough & Wilson, supra note 15, at 688-96.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
-'In Sackler v. Sackler, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N. Y. S.2d 61 (1962), af'd,
15 N. Y.2d 40, 203 N. E.2d 481, 255 N. Y. S.2d 83 (1964), the court said at 64:
"None of the reasons given by the courts for excluding in criminal trials the evidence gathered by unreasonable search and seizure applies to civil causes." See also
Walker v. Penner, 190 Ore. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951) ; 110 U. PA. L. Rrv. 1043 (1962);

8

UTAH

L. REv. 84, 87 (1962).

The court in the principal case failed to place any emphasis on the fact that the
evidence was taken at the instigation of a police officer. The Supreme Court, in
Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U. S. 392 (1963), was faced with the question whether evidence illegally seized by a government official should be admissible in an administrative proceeding. Justice Goldberg took the position that there was no need
for a federal injuction because of the substantial likelihood, in light of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), that the illegally obtained evidence would be excluded
in the state proceedings.
'zThis conclusion necessarily follows from the court's decision in the principal case.
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tion of the reasons given by the courts for excluding, in criminal trials,
evidence gathered by unreasonable search and seizure. Further, there
is good reason not to leave this issue of fact to the jury. It is doubtful
that the jury would be able to disregard the evidence, particularly when
there is-as in the principal case-no question as to its validity.
It is doubtful that the average jury would be interested in performing
the intellectual "gymnastic" of disregarding the evidence, their basic
aim being to do justice in the particular case rather than promote
long-term policies of law."
The court's approach, however, is not unique. On this particular
question,2 7 and in related areas of law,28 other courts have given
preliminary fact questions to the jury. Perhaps this is the result of
a "tenderness" for the party that would be adversely affected by
exclusion. 9 Whatever the basic reason behind the decision here, it
seems unfortunate that the court chose to ignore a commonly accepted
evidentiary principle by stating simply that "our system" gave them
no choice but to submit the question to the jury.3
DISCRETIONARY ACTS PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY
Plaintiffs sought damages from the State of Washington for property
destroyed by a juvenile escapee from Green Hill School, who set fire to
a church and adjoining house. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the
state was negligent in maintaining an "open program" in a "close
security" institution, and in assigning the juvenile, regarded as a
security risk, to the "open program."' Plaintiffs relied on a recent
statute purportedly abolishing state immunity from liability for torts
committed by officials, whether acting in a "governmental" or "propcCoRmICK, EVIDENCE § 53, at 123 (1954).
' McCreary v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 436, 307 S.W2d 948 (1957).
' Cases cited note 6 supra. See discussion and cases in 9 WIGSORE, EVIDENcE
§ 2550 (3d ed. 1940).
M'cCoRRicx, EVmENCE § 53, at 124 (1954).
66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 900, 406 P.2d at 626.
'Schools such as the one from which the juvenile escaped are "designated as close
security institutions to which shall be given the custody of children with the most
serious behavior problems." WASH. REv. CODE § 72.05.130(4) (1959). The institution
in question was comprised of various cottages to which boys were assigned. One cottage provided "maximum security and disciplinary isolation when required," but
others were part of an "open program" which became "progressively less restrictive
relative to assignment to work details, unescorted movement between details and
school classes, recreational outlets, and intercottage association." 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at
246-47, 407 P.2d at 442.

